Craig
08-08-2003, 03:26 AM
http://www.publicedcenter.org/stories/vietnam-nukes/
http://www.publicedcenter.org/stories/viet...Sharp-reply.pdf (http://www.publicedcenter.org/stories/vietnam-nukes/Sharp-reply.pdf)
New Info on U.S. Plans to Use Nukes in Vietnam
7/25/2003 ? The United States actively considered using tactical nuclear weapons in one of the largest battles of the Vietnam War according to a document (PDF) obtained by National Security News Service Bureau Chief David Armstrong. The document, obtained after an 11-year effort to have it declassified, reveals that the Pentagon engaged in intense planning for the possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam in early 1968.
U.S. contingency planning for the use of tactical nuclear weapons came against the backdrop of the siege of Khe Sanh, a Marine garrison near South Vietnam's border with Laos. In 1967, the North Vietnamese devised a new strategy for prosecuting the war: they hoped to lure American forces away from South Vietnam's main population centers by conducting a series of diversionary attacks in remote regions. The Viet Cong would then mount coordinated assaults against major South Vietnamese towns and cities in an effort to destabilize the Saigon government and incite a popular uprising. In the midst of the fighting, Hanoi would make renewed efforts to open negotiations with the United States.
Phase one of the plan began in October and November of 1967, when North Vietnamese troops attacked a Marine base near the Laotian border, towns near Saigon, and a village in the South's Central Highlands. A short time later, two Northern divisions began an assault on Khe Sanh. The Viet Cong, in the meantime, began infiltrating towns and cities in preparation for later attacks. The anti-Saigon National Liberation Front encouraged South Vietnamese officials to defect and spread rumors of peace talks in hopes of driving a wedge between the U.S. and its Southern ally. In December, Hanoi announced it would negotiate with the United States if American bombing of the North came to an end.
The attacks on the outlying regions succeeded in drawing U.S. attention. Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, dispatched troops to the areas, repelling the North Vietnamese assaults but leaving towns and cities vulnerable. Westmoreland placed especially heavy emphasis on the defense of Khe Sanh. The general ordered 6,000 Marines to the area and developed plans to pummel the enemy with massive air strikes. By the end of 1967, Khe Sanh had become a virtual U.S. obsession. Some administration officials, and much of the American public, viewed the siege as an attempt by the North for a repeat of Dien Bien Phu, the humiliating defeat that had driven the French from Indo-China in 1954. Determined to avoid such a scenario, the Marines dug in. As President Johnson declared, "I don't want any damn dinbinphoo."
The U.S. focus on defending Khe Sanh became particularly intense in late January and early February 1968, in the midst of the Tet Offensive. In the second phase of the North Vietnamese strategy, the Viet Cong launched a string of dramatic attacks against Southern towns and cities at the end January, during the Vietnamese New Year known as Tet. The offensive, while arguably a military failure, nevertheless shocked the American public, which for years had been spoon fed reports of U.S. "progress" in the war. American officials and military planners also reacted with alarm. On February 1, Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a memo to Westmoreland and Adm. Ulysses Grant Sharp Jr., the U.S. commander in the Pacific, raising the question of "whether tactical nuclear weapons should be used" if the situation in Khe Sanh became as desperate as Dien Bien Phu, where the prospect of using tactical atomic weapons had also received consideration. While noting that he considered such an eventuality "unlikely," Wheeler nonetheless asked that Sharp and Westmoreland put some of their "bright young planners" on the issues of whether there were targets in the area "which lend themselves to nuclear strikes"; whether "some contingency nuclear planning would be in order"; and what "some of the more significant pros and cons of using tack nukes" might be.
While it has been know for some time that the U.S. considered using nukes at Khe Sanh, the document obtained by the News Service, Adm. Sharp's reply to Wheeler's memo, sheds new light on the debate. In a Top Secret, "Eyes Only" memo to Wheeler on February 2, Sharp revealed that in the past several days he and Westmoreland had "exchanged views" on "the need for some very closely held planning for employment of tactical nuclear weapons should the situation around Khe Sanh warrant and should the highest national authority direct their use." Although noting that he and Westmoreland agreed that it was "highly unlikely" the situation at Khe Sanh would become "sufficiently desperate" to call for the use of tactical nukes, they felt that "military prudence alone requires that we do some detailed planning" for such a contingency. That planning, he noted, was already "well underway" by a team of military officials operating under "strictest security" in Okinawa under the unclassified name "Fracture Jaw." Sharp added that, given the "remote possibility" that tactical nuclear strikes might be required before the planning group had completed its work, he had provided Westmoreland with "step by step procedures for requesting the selective release of nuclear weapons." Sharp also explained that Westmoreland already held the "necessary documents and authenticators" to make such a request, and that he had informed the general of the "type and location of tactical nuclear weapons available and best suited to the purpose." Overall, Sharp expressed his belief that the U.S. was "prepared" for the possible use of nuclear weapons, "unlikely as that might be."
Washington ultimately ordered a halt to the planning for the use of tactical nukes out of fear that exposure of the study would add fuel to the growing anti-war protests in the U.S. As historian Stanley Karnow reports, "Westmoreland later denounced the ban, arguing that the use of nuclear weapons could conceivably have compelled the Communists to capitulate, in the same way that two atomic bombs 'had spoken convincingly' to the Japanese leaders during World War II."
The U.S. did not, of course, resort to nuclear weapons at Khe Sanh, relying instead on conventional munitions. During the nine-week siege, B-52s dropped more than 75-thousand tons of explosives on a five-square-mile battlefield, the heaviest bombing deluge in the history of warfare.
In the end, America's emphasis on the importance of Khe Sanh proved misguided. This became clear when, shortly after Westmoreland's tour in Vietnam ended in June, 1968, the U.S. simply abandoned the Marine outpost. Yet, just a few months earlier, U.S. officials and military planners had actively debated the use of nuclear weapons in defense of the garrison.
Citing the declassified document:
National Security Files; National Security Council Histories; Folder: March 31st Speech, volume 2; Box 47; LBJ Presidential Library, Austin, TX.
For more information:
Additional records regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons at Khe Sanh.
For a detailed account of U.S. planning for the possible use of nuclear weapons at Khe Sanh, see: William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968 (Washington: Center of Military History, 1988), pp. 341-42, 361, 362-63.
For more on the siege of Khe Sanh, see: Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: Viking Press, 1983, pp. 539-542.
Information on an earlier incident in which the U.S. considered using nuclear weapons in Vietnam.
http://members.easyspace.com/airdrop/nukes/nukes.html
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/mj0.../mj03hayes.html (http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/mj03/mj03hayes.html)
http://www.publicedcenter.org/stories/viet...Sharp-reply.pdf (http://www.publicedcenter.org/stories/vietnam-nukes/Sharp-reply.pdf)
New Info on U.S. Plans to Use Nukes in Vietnam
7/25/2003 ? The United States actively considered using tactical nuclear weapons in one of the largest battles of the Vietnam War according to a document (PDF) obtained by National Security News Service Bureau Chief David Armstrong. The document, obtained after an 11-year effort to have it declassified, reveals that the Pentagon engaged in intense planning for the possible use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam in early 1968.
U.S. contingency planning for the use of tactical nuclear weapons came against the backdrop of the siege of Khe Sanh, a Marine garrison near South Vietnam's border with Laos. In 1967, the North Vietnamese devised a new strategy for prosecuting the war: they hoped to lure American forces away from South Vietnam's main population centers by conducting a series of diversionary attacks in remote regions. The Viet Cong would then mount coordinated assaults against major South Vietnamese towns and cities in an effort to destabilize the Saigon government and incite a popular uprising. In the midst of the fighting, Hanoi would make renewed efforts to open negotiations with the United States.
Phase one of the plan began in October and November of 1967, when North Vietnamese troops attacked a Marine base near the Laotian border, towns near Saigon, and a village in the South's Central Highlands. A short time later, two Northern divisions began an assault on Khe Sanh. The Viet Cong, in the meantime, began infiltrating towns and cities in preparation for later attacks. The anti-Saigon National Liberation Front encouraged South Vietnamese officials to defect and spread rumors of peace talks in hopes of driving a wedge between the U.S. and its Southern ally. In December, Hanoi announced it would negotiate with the United States if American bombing of the North came to an end.
The attacks on the outlying regions succeeded in drawing U.S. attention. Gen. William Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, dispatched troops to the areas, repelling the North Vietnamese assaults but leaving towns and cities vulnerable. Westmoreland placed especially heavy emphasis on the defense of Khe Sanh. The general ordered 6,000 Marines to the area and developed plans to pummel the enemy with massive air strikes. By the end of 1967, Khe Sanh had become a virtual U.S. obsession. Some administration officials, and much of the American public, viewed the siege as an attempt by the North for a repeat of Dien Bien Phu, the humiliating defeat that had driven the French from Indo-China in 1954. Determined to avoid such a scenario, the Marines dug in. As President Johnson declared, "I don't want any damn dinbinphoo."
The U.S. focus on defending Khe Sanh became particularly intense in late January and early February 1968, in the midst of the Tet Offensive. In the second phase of the North Vietnamese strategy, the Viet Cong launched a string of dramatic attacks against Southern towns and cities at the end January, during the Vietnamese New Year known as Tet. The offensive, while arguably a military failure, nevertheless shocked the American public, which for years had been spoon fed reports of U.S. "progress" in the war. American officials and military planners also reacted with alarm. On February 1, Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a memo to Westmoreland and Adm. Ulysses Grant Sharp Jr., the U.S. commander in the Pacific, raising the question of "whether tactical nuclear weapons should be used" if the situation in Khe Sanh became as desperate as Dien Bien Phu, where the prospect of using tactical atomic weapons had also received consideration. While noting that he considered such an eventuality "unlikely," Wheeler nonetheless asked that Sharp and Westmoreland put some of their "bright young planners" on the issues of whether there were targets in the area "which lend themselves to nuclear strikes"; whether "some contingency nuclear planning would be in order"; and what "some of the more significant pros and cons of using tack nukes" might be.
While it has been know for some time that the U.S. considered using nukes at Khe Sanh, the document obtained by the News Service, Adm. Sharp's reply to Wheeler's memo, sheds new light on the debate. In a Top Secret, "Eyes Only" memo to Wheeler on February 2, Sharp revealed that in the past several days he and Westmoreland had "exchanged views" on "the need for some very closely held planning for employment of tactical nuclear weapons should the situation around Khe Sanh warrant and should the highest national authority direct their use." Although noting that he and Westmoreland agreed that it was "highly unlikely" the situation at Khe Sanh would become "sufficiently desperate" to call for the use of tactical nukes, they felt that "military prudence alone requires that we do some detailed planning" for such a contingency. That planning, he noted, was already "well underway" by a team of military officials operating under "strictest security" in Okinawa under the unclassified name "Fracture Jaw." Sharp added that, given the "remote possibility" that tactical nuclear strikes might be required before the planning group had completed its work, he had provided Westmoreland with "step by step procedures for requesting the selective release of nuclear weapons." Sharp also explained that Westmoreland already held the "necessary documents and authenticators" to make such a request, and that he had informed the general of the "type and location of tactical nuclear weapons available and best suited to the purpose." Overall, Sharp expressed his belief that the U.S. was "prepared" for the possible use of nuclear weapons, "unlikely as that might be."
Washington ultimately ordered a halt to the planning for the use of tactical nukes out of fear that exposure of the study would add fuel to the growing anti-war protests in the U.S. As historian Stanley Karnow reports, "Westmoreland later denounced the ban, arguing that the use of nuclear weapons could conceivably have compelled the Communists to capitulate, in the same way that two atomic bombs 'had spoken convincingly' to the Japanese leaders during World War II."
The U.S. did not, of course, resort to nuclear weapons at Khe Sanh, relying instead on conventional munitions. During the nine-week siege, B-52s dropped more than 75-thousand tons of explosives on a five-square-mile battlefield, the heaviest bombing deluge in the history of warfare.
In the end, America's emphasis on the importance of Khe Sanh proved misguided. This became clear when, shortly after Westmoreland's tour in Vietnam ended in June, 1968, the U.S. simply abandoned the Marine outpost. Yet, just a few months earlier, U.S. officials and military planners had actively debated the use of nuclear weapons in defense of the garrison.
Citing the declassified document:
National Security Files; National Security Council Histories; Folder: March 31st Speech, volume 2; Box 47; LBJ Presidential Library, Austin, TX.
For more information:
Additional records regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons at Khe Sanh.
For a detailed account of U.S. planning for the possible use of nuclear weapons at Khe Sanh, see: William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968 (Washington: Center of Military History, 1988), pp. 341-42, 361, 362-63.
For more on the siege of Khe Sanh, see: Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, New York: Viking Press, 1983, pp. 539-542.
Information on an earlier incident in which the U.S. considered using nuclear weapons in Vietnam.
http://members.easyspace.com/airdrop/nukes/nukes.html
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/mj0.../mj03hayes.html (http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/mj03/mj03hayes.html)