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TB4000
01-23-2004, 06:10 PM
Experts: Remote E-Voting Still Workable



By RACHEL KONRAD, AP Technology Writer

SAN JOSE, Calif. - Despite a Pentagon (news - web sites) project criticized this week as dangerously vulnerable to hackers and terrorists, reliable Internet voting from overseas still could be workable, computer scientists agree.



But a secure system would not be ready for this year's presidential election, they say.


Under the Pentagon project, up to 100,000 people from Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah and Washington — most of them U.S. service personnel — will be eligible to vote abroad in November.


They can vote from any old cybercafe, as long as it has the right operating system and browser.


Many prominent computer experts believe the current system is irresponsible. They say rigorous precautions and security improvements, including properly trained poll workers and dedicated terminals at U.S. embassies or military bases, are needed to make Internet voting as fraud-resistant as the physical ballot box.


The U.S. military says it's willing to make significant changes to its system, known as SERVE, including installation of computer kiosks at U.S. bases and the use of data encryption.


But it won't implement changes until after a detailed analysis of this year's election results.


"We don't have blinders on," said Defense Department spokesman Glenn Flood. "Congress told us to take a look at using Internet technology to prevent the mishaps of regular snail mail for absentee voters. ... We're glad to have feedback and make modifications."


A 10-member peer review board will interview SERVE participants after they vote, and report to Congress next year. If successful, SERVE — an acronym for Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment — could be adapted domestically to help boost turnout among other disenfranchised groups, ranging from the elderly to college students.


Meg McLaughlin, president of Reston, Va.-based Accenture eDemocracy Services, which developed SERVE, said the system replicates in a Web browser the look and feel of digital voting systems in thousands of precincts. A final confirmation page allows changes but does not allow the voter to print out a record.


Results are transmitted to SERVE servers in undisclosed locations. Servers in counties where people are registered tap into SERVE servers on a periodic basis through a secure connection — not the open Internet.


"The odds of this flopping are very remote," said Michael Alvarez, co-director of the CalTech-MIT/Voting Technology Project and principal investigator of the Defense Department's contract to produce SERVE.


"SERVE has gone really far to making an amazingly sophisticated and secure architecture — the most sophisticated system I've seen," Alvarez said.


But critics say the system fails in its overarching reliance on the Internet, which they contend exposes elections to hackers, cyberterrorists, power outages, downed telephone lines, computer viruses and software bugs.


They're recommending a system that would let pre-registered voters log onto dedicated terminals at military bases or consulates for ballots from home counties. Trained elections officials would maintain software and machines. Only voters with approved military IDs or SERVE-authorized IDs could log in.


Never connected to the Internet, kiosks would receive software and voter databases on disks delivered by certified mail. Voters would print and sign ballots and mail them back their registrar.


Ballots could be sent electronically to firewall-protected computers with broadband connections, saving weeks or months it takes for mail in remote Afghanistan (news - web sites) or Arctic research stations.





Even the four prominent computer experts who issued a blistering analysis of SERVE on Wednesday, saying the system should be scrapped, acknowledged that the Internet is too convenient and popular to ignore as a voting medium — particularly for military personnel.

Nearly one in three overseas soldiers registered to vote in the 2000 presidential election didn't receive ballots in time. About one in five said they didn't register because they found the mail-in process daunting, according to Pentagon research.

Since Wednesday, hundreds of programmers in online chat groups have posted recommendations to make the Internet a more secure voting medium. Many worried that the $22 million Pentagon experiment, which began in the summer of 2002, was a rushed attempt at avoiding dangling chads and other shortcomings of the mostly analog 2000 presidential election.

"I believe that eventually the Internet is going to be the way to go," said David J. Farber, computer science and public policy professor at Carnegie Mellon University. "But we're going to have to invest in making it happen."

Some experts suggest installing biometric devices — including optical or finger scans — or smart card readers to gain access to dedicated voting terminals abroad. But proponents of SERVE say such steps are unnecessary.

The vast majority of overseas voters are military personnel and their relatives, and they must present numerous forms of identification to access to computers on battleships or bases.


Granted, it could get more people to vote, but no system is 100% hacker proof, and you know someone is gonna put in 300 votes for Ross Perot or something.

mr. x
01-23-2004, 06:13 PM
Granted, it could get more people to vote, but no system is 100% hacker proof, and you know someone is gonna put in 300 votes for Ross Perot or something.

that many votes probly coulda changed the election of 2000 :rolleyes:

ShortNBitter
01-23-2004, 08:24 PM
Yeah I read an article about e-voting and stuff like that. Apparently alot of those machines are able to manipulated very easily. I think there might be something in the future with this but right now its still very unsafe :eek:

Can you imagine Bush winning by 6Billion votes :biggrin: ??

hooligan
01-23-2004, 08:27 PM
check this out, for the USAC elections for our student government the political slates are usually divided between the ethnic groups and fraternities/sororities.

what the greeks would do would throw parties where if you wanted to go to them, they forced you to vote online for the candidates that they sponsor before letting you come in. this happened before my time at ucla and when online voting was halted due to concerns like these ethnic groups were able to vote their candidates in.

mr. x
01-23-2004, 10:12 PM
Yeah I read an article about e-voting and stuff like that. Apparently alot of those machines are able to manipulated very easily. I think there might be something in the future with this but right now its still very unsafe :eek:

Can you imagine Bush winning by 6Billion votes :biggrin: ??

no offense but after the maggie cho hate mail incident i dont think a lot of bush supporters are exactly the most computer literate

myself808
01-24-2004, 05:31 AM
From the end of a Wired article: (http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.01/evote.html?pg=4&topic=&topic_set=) 5 Worst-case Scenarios By Paul O'Donnell
Today's digital voting machines don't keep a paper record of individual votes, so if something goes wrong, there's no backup for the data. And if history is a guide, something will go wrong. Officials have answers for every scenario, but some of their solutions are more convincing than others.
SCENARIO: A rogue programmer tweaks the code to swap votes from Democrat to Republican, or vice versa.
SAFEGUARD: Logic-and-Accuracy testing roots out any such code bombs. And in the actual program that counts votes, ballot positions are scrambled, making a switch hard to mastermind.
SCENARIO: A voter upgrades his access with a counterfeit version of the smartcard issued to every person as they vote. Result: He can vote multiple times.
SAFEGUARD: The voting booths have no curtains; polling-place volunteers are trained to watch for suspicious behavior.
SCENARIO: A hacker changes the count on memory cards from individual machines or on the server used to tally the votes.
SAFEGUARD: The number of votes won't match the totals on hardwired memory in each DRE device - or the number of voters who signed the rolls.
SCENARIO: A power outage cuts electricity to the polls.
SAFEGUARD: Internal batteries provide juice in a blackout, and many polling places - schools, churches, and so on - have disaster preparedness kits that include generators.
SCENARIO: Someone walks out of a polling booth and announces he has gamed the machine and no one will ever figure out how.
SAFEGUARD: Polling-place staffers take the DRE offline and call tech support for a diagnostic. Meanwhile they look for obvious discrepancies, like more votes recorded than voter signatures on the rolls. the rest of the article doesn't paint a rosy picture of internet voting.

ShortNBitter
01-24-2004, 10:59 AM
no offense but after the maggie cho hate mail incident i dont think a lot of bush supporters are exactly the most computer literate

the neocons will find a way :redface:

hooligan
01-24-2004, 11:11 AM
the neocons will find a way :redface:
all too true.

ism
01-24-2004, 11:25 AM
I'm all for it. Any way to make voting easier and more accessible is good. But we're definitely nowhere near creating such a system. Voting from a cybercafe is just plain scary. Someone could have a trojanned web browser or some rogue program to manipulate the process.

And changing the ballot order? I seriously do not think that is a good idea. While it may defeat hack programs that depend on a particular order, an oddly-ordered ballot will only serve to confuse the voter.

It's all about authentication, secure communication, and accounting. A lot of the problems mentioned have similar counterparts with normal voting, but the main difference is that there's a chain of accountability and the process is securely logged on legacy media (paper). The computers must spit out a hardcopy, no way around it.

As long as corporate interests such as Diebold drive the design, we will not have a good system. The government ought to award grants to researchers for this particular problem.

Faithless
01-27-2004, 07:19 AM
As long as corporate interests such as Diebold drive the design, we will not have a good system. The government ought to award grants to researchers for this particular problem.

The Diebold issue is very scarey!

Sidebar: Papering Over E-voting Problems (http://www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/management/story/0,10801,89293,00.html)
The politically paranoid got even more nervous last year when researchers at Johns Hopkins University analyzed the code inside AccuVote-TS machines built by Diebold Inc. and found it flawed.

Avi Rubin, technical director for the Johns Hopkins' Information Security Institute in Baltimore, which evaluated the Diebold source code, says the company's developers used Data Encryption Standard, an outdated encryption technology, and "then they used it wrongly."

His team's research claims that smart cards used by voters to access the machines can be counterfeited, letting voters "cast multiple ballots without leaving any trace." Furthermore, security was lax enough to permit precinct workers to fiddle with the machines' vote tallies.

Rubin adds that the systems are also vulnerable when they communicate to "home base, both to fetch election configuration information and to report final election results." According to the research, Diebold's technology "[does] not use cryptographic techniques to authenticate the remote end of the connection nor do they check the integrity of the data in transit."

North Canton, Ohio-based Diebold has attacked the report as "inaccurate" and suggested that Rubin is biased because he consulted with a Diebold competitor. A Diebold spokesman also says that the researchers ignored local election certification processes that help secure the systems.

But Douglas Jones, a professor who studies election technology at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, says those processes are neither rigorous nor well enforced, especially when it comes to certifying technology.

He points to a study of Diebold systems in California that found that every county that used the systems ignored the proper procedures for certifying and registering the machines.

Both Rubin and Jones say the best way to ensure secure and accurate automated voting is with a paper audit trail. Indeed, some states have moved to provide election officials with a printed ballot for audit purposes. Voters could check the paper ballot by viewing it through a glass window.

Anne Martens, chief of communications for the Oregon secretary of state, who oversees elections, agrees. "Having a paper trail increases voter confidence," she says.
Plus there is this issue that the politics of a Diebold could determine an election.